Beyond the Informal/Formal Divide: How do Firms Combine Contract-enforcement Institutions?

HETFA Working Paper No. 2017/21 Károly Mike, Gábor Kiss (2017): Beyond the Informal/Formal Divide: How do Firms Combine Contract-enforcement Institutions? ISSN 2062-378X In this paper Károly Mike and Gábor Kiss explore how a broad range of contract-enforcement institutions are combined in interfirm relationships under a developed legal system. They analyse managerial survey data to identify ideal-types of […]

Contracting for Structural Funds

HETFA Working Paper No. 8. Károly Mike – Gábor Balás: Contracting for Structural Funds – How the EU’s Rules of the Game Shape the Behaviour of Member State Governments ISBN 978-963-89112-6-1; ISSN 2062-378X How do the rules of the game of EU cohesion policy shape the behaviour of Member State governments as they pursue their development […]

Competitiveness Presumes a Reinforced Cooperation

’The basic requirement of competitiveness is the reinforcement of cooperation, whereas corruption is a general contractual failure’ argues Károly Mike, senior research fellow of HETFA, in his interview given to the Financial Review Online [Pénzügyi Szemle Online]. Based on the theory of institutional economics, our research fellow suggests, first, to conduct a mapping on the […]